INTRODUCTION
There are few types of securities as internationally issued and traded as the debt securities-often called asset-backed securities ("ABS") or, when specifically backed by mortgage loans, mortgage-backed securities ("MBS") 2 -issued in securitization transactions. 3 European investors commonly invest in ABS issued in U.S. securitization transactions, 4 and vice versa.
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Securitization epitomizes the disintermediation of bank credit that is characteristic of the so-called shadow banking system. 6 In a typical securitization transaction, a sponsor will purchase a pool of loans or other rights to payment ("financial assets") from firms, such as mortgage lenders, originating those assets ("originators") and sell them to a special purpose entity ("SPE"). The SPE will issue securities to investors, repayable from the periodic financial asset payments. Securitization enables originators to multiply their available funding by selling off their loans for cash, from which they can make new 2 This article will use the broader term, ABS, to include MBS. 3 In Europe, securitization is spelled securitisation. 4 Cf. It is generally agreed that securitization's abuses contributed to the global financial crisis ("financial crisis"). Repayment of ABS issued in certain highly leveraged securitization transactions, usually called "ABS CDO" transactions, 8 was so "extremely sensitive to cash-flow variations" that, when "the cash-flow assumptions turned out to be wrong, many of these [highly rated securities] defaulted or were downgraded." 9 That, in turn, sparked a loss of confidence in the value of credit ratings and highly rated debt securities generally.
The regulatory responses to securitization in the United States and Europe are, at least in part, ad hoc political reactions to the financial crisis. Parts I and II of this article explain, and Part III compares and critiques, these responses. Thereafter, Part IV of the article examines how existing regulation could be made more systematic by identifying the market failures that apply distinctively to securitization and analyzing how those market failures could be corrected.
I. U.S. REGULATORY RESPONSES
The U.S. regulatory responses are primarily embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act and in part embodied in the U.S. implementation of the Basel III capital requirements. These responses conceptually fall into four categories: increasing disclosure, requiring riskretention, reforming rating agencies, and imposing capital requirements. As will be seen, Residential Mortgages 16 ) that the securitizer, through the issuance of an asset-backed security, transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party. For example, securitizers are required to retain at least 5% of the credit risk for non-qualified residential mortgage-loan assets that they transfer, sell, or convey through the issuance of an asset-backed security.
The regulations prohibit securitizers from directly or indirectly hedging or otherwise transferring the credit risk they are required to retain with respect to an asset.
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C. Rating-Agency Reform
To increase the reliability of credit ratings issued by rating agencies, § 943 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to prescribe regulations requiring each nationally recognized statistical rating organization ("NRSRO," the U.S. regulatory term for a rating agency) to include in any report accompanying a credit rating a description of the representations, warranties, and enforcement mechanisms available to investors and how these differ from the representations, warranties, and enforcement mechanisms in issuances of similar securities. 18 The Dodd-Frank Act also significantly reduces reliance on rating agencies by banks and federal agencies. , and the criteria that denote it, must be established."). 29 The U.S. regulations contemplate only limited standardization, and they impose that as a requirement rather than as an incentive. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text (discussing standardizing data and disclosing such data).
themselves meet simplicity requirements, including being homogenous, creditworthy (e.g., not in default, not from obligors that are insolvent or have adverse credit history or low credit scores), and not constituting already securitized financial assets.
Article 9 of Chapter 3 sets forth the standardization requirements. Among other things, interest-rate risk and exchange-rate risk must be hedged and, other than to effect such hedging, the underlying financial assets cannot include or be buttressed by derivatives (as would be the case in a "synthetic" securitization). The transaction documentation must clearly specify the obligations, duties, and responsibilities of the servicer and back-up servicer to ensure efficient and continuing servicing of the financial assets and must also include clear provisions facilitating the timely resolution of conflicts among different classes of investors.
Article 10 of Chapter 3 sets forth the transparency requirements. Among other things, the originator or sponsor must provide investors a cash flow model and also provide them access to information on historical default, delinquency, and loss performance for substantially similar financial assets to those being securitized. Also, a sample of the underlying financial assets shall be subject to external verification by an independent party.
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I later discuss why these criteria for STS securitizations are sensible.
B. Risk-Retention
Article 4 of the EU-proposed regulations also creates, for most securitizations, a risk-retention requirement similar to the U.S. risk-retention requirement. 32 To avoid a 30 Even securitizations engaged in by asset-backed commercial paper ("ABCP") conduits can qualify as STS if the commercial paper has maturities not exceeding a year, the conduit provides investors with monthly data on all of its collections and liabilities, and the underlying financial assets are of the same asset type and have a weighted average life of no more than two years (with underlying financial assets having a life of more than three years The STS approach, in contrast, does not require standardization but merely rewards standardized simplicity-and it appears to contemplate a significant degree of market flexibility in achieving that simplicity. Furthermore, STS securitizations should encompass the basic types of securitization transactions that were originated in the 1980s
and became economically significant during the 1990s, when the SEC described them as "becoming one of the dominant means of capital formation in the United States".
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Incentivizing these types of transactions appears sensible.
B. Critique of Risk-Retention
As mentioned, the intended purpose of risk-retention is to reduce moral hazard resulting from the originate-to-distribute model of loan origination, thereby improving the quality of the financial assets underlying securitization transactions. 42 It is unclear whether a legal risk-retention requirement will improve financial asset quality.
In my experience, the market itself has always mandated risk-retention. what it is about finance that could result in systemic market failures, which need regulation to correct. Subpart A below identifies these market failures. Thereafter, Subpart B examines which of these market failures can apply distinctively to securitization and, in that context, analyzes how such market failures could be corrected.
A. Identifying Market Failures
In a macroprudential context, I have argued that finance has at least five fundamental market failures that need regulation to correct: complexity, conflicts, complacency, change, and a type of tragedy of the commons (which I sometimes call the "4Cs and the TOC"). 63 Consider them in turn. 60 Macroprudential regulation refers to regulation intended to reduce systemic risk. 61 Statement of Luc Laeven, reported in Binyamin Appelbaum, Skepticism Prevails on Preventing Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2015, at B1 (also observing the "troubling reality" that "policy makers have made little progress in figuring out how they might actually" prevent another financial crisis). 62 Cf. Robert Hockett, "Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal Considerations" 12-13 (Jan. 20, 2013 draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund; on file with author) (discussing the "emergent macroprudential 'toolkit' as currently constituted"). 63 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and Limits of Law, 2012 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 815; also available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016434 (discussing these categories).
solve this problem by requiring systemically important firms to pay secondary managers under longer-term compensation arrangements. But the ability of these managers to work anywhere creates an international collective action problem, requiring effective regulation to be global to avoid prejudicing the competitiveness of firms subject to particular national rules. to free-ride-failing to perform sufficient due diligence-that sometimes occurs when financial firms compete.
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The market failure of complacency is difficult to correct. Human nature cannot easily be changed, and increasing complexity can increase irrationality. Even incentive failure is hard to correct. Although regulation could require-perhaps for certain large issuances of complex securities-that a minimum unhedged position be held by a single sophisticated investor in each class of securities, regulatory attempts to limit risk dispersion would have tradeoffs: increasing the potential for regulatory arbitrage, became more widely accepted, firms began to compensate secondary managers for their ability to generate profits with low risk, as measured by VaR. Secondary managers therefore turned to products with low VaR profiles, such as credit default swaps which generate small gains and seldom experience losses. The secondary managers knew, but often did not inform their superiors, that when losses did occur they could be massive. 70 See id. (observing that realigning secondary manager compensation with the long-term health of a firm faces a collective action problem: firms will be reluctant to employ a contingent or deferred compensation structure because doing so would put the firm at a competitive disadvantage in attracting talented managers, and therefore regulation may therefore be necessary to overcome this impasse). 71 Cf. supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (observing that complexity makes understanding harder, which, like the Delphic Oracle, makes people prone to see what they want to see). 72 I also refer to this as risk marginalization.
impairing the ability of parties to achieve negotiated market efficiencies, and possibly even increasing financial instability.
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Market failures resulting from complacency will therefore be inevitable. I later examine ex post mitigative regulation that could reduce the harmful systemic consequences of market failures. Financial regulation must transcend that time-bound architecture because without continuous monitoring and updating-which rarely occurs because it is costly and subject to political interference-present-day regulation can quickly become outmoded.
Tragedy of the Commons.
Systemic risk in part results from a type of tragedy of the commons. While the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual participants, the costs 73 In the financial crisis, the almost exclusive emphasis on bank regulation failed to adequately address the disintermediation created by securitization. Similarly, the regulation of securitization, especially in the United States, is primarily tied to the past and current financial architecture, where the primary financial asset underlying ABS is mortgage loans. 86 Witness the Dodd-Frank Act's preoccupation with regulating mortgage lending. 87 We cannot predict, however, the types of financial assets that in the future will underlie ABS. Rights to payment in the form of loans are typically significant asset categories. Any type of loan can include subprime borrowers if-as in a bubble 88 -borrowers become enamored of investing in a particular type of asset and lenders believe that asset value will inevitably increase. As a parallel to the subprime mortgage lending that preceded the financial crisis, 89 consider the subprime margin lending that was a causal factor of the Great Depression.
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Prior to the Depression, many banks engaged in margin lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares of stock that the borrowers purchased with the loan proceeds. The value of the stock collateral started out being at least equal to the 86 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 87 The Dodd-Frank Act focused on a range of mortgage lending laws, including abilityto-repay rules, high-cost mortgage and homeownership counseling, modifications to mortgage servicing rules, modifications to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, appraisals under the Truth in Lending Act, and loan originator compensation structures. however, there was a (relatively) modest decline in stock prices, causing some of these margin loans to become undercollateralized. 93 Some banks that were heavily engaged in margin lending then lost so much money on the loans that they themselves became unable to pay their debts, including the debts they owed to other banks. As a result, defaults by these margin-lending banks adversely affected the other banks' ability to meet their obligations, starting a chain of bank failures.
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Just as we cannot always predict changes in the types of financial assets that will be securitized in the future, financial change can also evolve incrementally without critical recognition of the increasing risk. In examining the origin of the financial crisis, for example, Professor Judge argues that the myopic focus of market participants and regulators on the latest incremental developments prevented them from viewing the "big picture" and taking account of layered complexity and its attendant systemic risk.
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The lesson is that change can create failures that cannot be fully predicted. " incremental nature of the processes through which financial innovations become highly complex is critical to understanding how that complexity develops and why that complexity itself may not be subjected to close scrutiny"). 96 See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 85 (analyzing how ex ante financial regulation should be supplemented by ex post regulation to mitigate systemic consequences). In a broader financial context, I have also analyzed how regulation could better address change by regulating the functions of finance, which remain more constant over time. See
